Greetings once again, Samurai Archives fans! It’s me, ltdomer98,
or Nate, as those of you who listen to our podcast know me. Of course, a
blogpost from me means there’s military history to discuss, so get ready for a
5 (yes FIVE) part series of posts.
Over the next few days, we’re going to discuss another US military
concept: the Principles of Joint Operations, as found in US Joint Publication
3-0, Joint Operations, published 11 August 2011. Some of you students of
military history may be familiar with the Principles of War, 9 principles used
by militaries to describe and focus action. Originally conceived by Antoine Henri Jomini, a veteran of Napoleon’s army, in the 1800’s, the Principles of War
were: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, Unity of Command,
Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. As a lieutenant way back at the dawn of
time (or the late 1990’s), I was taught them by means of the acronym “MOOSEMUSS”,
since no one in the Army can possibly learn anything without a catchy acronym.
The best example I can use is
Okehazama again. We all (well, most of us) know the story: Oda Nobunaga, with a
force of a few thousand, defeated the much larger Imagawa army under Yoshimoto
with somewhere between 25,000-30,000 troops by sneaking in under the cover a
rain storm to attack Yoshimoto’s lightly defended headquarters. As Nobunaga
rode from Kiyosu to the battlefield, he gathered up smaller parties of warriors
along the way, and other small contingents met him closer to where the Imagawa
were encamped. Nobunaga didn’t match up with the Imagawa army soldier for
soldier—in a field battle of force vs. force, he surely would have been annihilated
by sheer weight of numbers. The mass
of the Imagawa would have overwhelmed Nobunaga, and Japanese history would be
very different today.
The above comments represent the views of the author only, and should not be interpreted to represent the views or official position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.
Yes, I know it’s been a long time since I blogged on military
concepts—most of you probably don’t remember this post from 2010 about the Levels of War concept. That’s okay. I promise this will fill that desperate
ache for US military doctrine applied to Sengoku Japanese warfare.
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| Jomini, looking very happy |
The world is a different place now than it was back then, and the
Army (and US military as a whole) is a different Army. We’ve learned lots of
things from Iraq and Afghanistan, through failure as much or more than success.
With that in mind, the doctrine writers have been busy the last few years. Many
of the Army publications I used just last year as the doctrinal basis for my
analysis of Nagashino are now out of date; the information and concepts are not
necessarily out of use, but much has been updated and streamlined, and
eventually I will have to go back through and determine what changes I need to
make in my papers. But, that’s for a different time.
The point of all this is that, in addition the 9 Principles of War
listed above, the US military has added three more principles to make a list of
“Principles of Joint Operations.” These new principles—Restraint, Perseverance,
and Legitimacy—reflect the lessons of the Counterinsurgency (COIN) concepts now
being used by Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So, if they’re new, they don’t apply to 16th century
Japan, right? Well, I’m going to show you that they do. These concepts, while
newly codified into Joint doctrine, aren’t new at all, and in fact played just
a prominent a part in warfare in the Sengoku period as any of the original
Principles of War.
I will discuss three principles per post, defining them and using
examples from (mostly) Sengoku warfare to illustrate the concepts. The final
post, I’ll use them collectively to analyze commander actions at a battle in
Japanese history. Those of you who know me can guess which one I might use.
With that, let’s start with the first Principle.
Objective
(1)
The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward
a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.
(2)
The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support
attainment of the overall political
goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the
enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of
joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define;
nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly,
quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic
objectives. [Commanders] should avoid actions that do not contribute directly
to achieving the objective(s).
(3)
Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and
military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may
occur because the situation itself changes. The [Commander] should anticipate these shifts in political goals
necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may
be very subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no
longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force
security may be compromised.[1]
Let’s start with the first point (because where else would we
start?). Every military option should have a clearly defined and achievable
goal, or objective. For some of you,
this may seem like the most obvious thing ever. Why go in to battle, or start a
war, unless you know why you are doing it? However, this isn’t as obvious as
you might think. Many historical examples show that sometimes military
commanders really aren’t sure what they were trying to do, or weren’t exactly
sure how they were going to do it. This is at the root of all the contemporary
debates about “exit strategy” in Iraq and Afghanistan. A commander has to
identify what it is he is trying to accomplish, both to identify the means to
do so and to know when he is done.
Some failures come from lack of a coherent objective at all. The
difference between the vague goal of “conquer more territory” and the specific,
yet similar goal of “conquer enemies and attain supremacy over all of Japan” is
the difference between a local warlord who probably didn’t last long and an Oda
Nobunaga, who had the vision to map out a path to that strategic objective.
Other failures come from setting objectives that are unrealistic:
Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of the Asian mainland failed in part because it
was way too ambitious to believe he could invade China and conquer the entire
landmass; Hideyoshi had no concept of the scale of operation that objective
would require.
Astute readers may recognize concepts from the Levels of War at
work in the second point. “Each operation must contribute to strategic
objectives.” Otherwise, you’re wasting your time and energy. More on
that when we get to other concepts.
The third point means that circumstances can change that either
accomplish your objective, or render it irrelevant, in which case you need to
readjust and pursue a new objective. Tokugawa Ieyasu’s objective as the advance
guard for Imagawa Yoshimoto’s army in 1560 was to secure the forward
fortifications at Marune and Washizu in order to secure Yoshimoto’s passage with
the main force; the objective was rendered obsolete when Oda Nobunaga destroyed
Yoshimoto’s headquarters and killed him, so Ieyasu retreated to preserve
himself and his force. His objective changed from support to Yoshimoto’s army
to self-preservation and independence as he split from the weakened Imagawa.
Offensive
(1)
The purpose of an offensive action is to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative.
(2)
Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined
objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and
holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive
results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all
levels of war.
(3)
Commanders adopt the defensive only as a
temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or regain the
initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all
defensive operations.
There are two ways to succinctly explain this Principle. The first
is through sports: you can have the best defense in the world, but you still have
to score at least one more point than your opponent to win. The second is Newton’s first law of motion: objects in motion stay in motion, and objects at
rest stay at rest, unless an outside force acts upon it. I have just simultaneously appealed to both the jock
crowd and the science nerds—we’re all about bringing everyone together in the
name of Japanese history.
In warfare, the side initiating action is said to be on the
offensive, and generally is the side forcing the other side to react to it. You
can deter an enemy through defensive action, but you cannot defeat them without
taking the fight to them. As point 3 states, defense is temporary: commanders
go on the defensive to take advantage of terrain or other circumstances to
defeat the opponent’s attack or to buy time and build combat power until they
can take the offensive themselves. Defeating your opponent’s attack, only to
let them retreat and rebuild by not taking the offensive yourself, accomplishes
only temporary goals.
Nobunaga’s campaigns are a good example of Offensive operations.
Nobunaga was truly the first samurai commander to divide his operations into
theaters, with Hideyoshi commanding his forces in western Japan, Shibata
Katsuie commanding Oda forces in the north, Sakuma Nobumori leading forces
against the Ishiyama Honganji in central Japan, and Tokugawa Ieyasu (as a
subordinate ally) in charge in the Tokai region to the east. Nobunaga never
ceased being on the offensive—he would move between theaters with his main army
to exploit offensive opportunities created by his subordinate commanders. When
an objective (see, these all tie together) in one area was reached he would
shift focus to the next offensive opportunity—for instance, when the surrender
of the Ishiyama Honganji was finalized, he shifted focus to the final
destruction of the Takeda in Shinano and Kai.
Mass
(1)
The purpose of mass is to concentrate
the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce
decisive results.
(2)
In order to achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated and
synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.
Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of combat power, rather than concentrating forces, can
enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and
minimize human losses and waste of resources.
Mass isn’t very hard to understand: as
Napoleon supposedly said, “God is on the side
of the big battalions.” But it’s not as simple as having more troops—allegedly,
Voltaire’s retort was “God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best.” Voltaire
highlights an important point: it’s not the numbers, but the massed effects that matter.
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| Imagawa Yoshimoto meets his end at Okehazama |
However, the Imagawa were dispersed
over much of the countryside, as my example above with Ieyasu’s vanguard
already noted. The headquarters at Dengakuhazama was in full non-tactical mode
because they assumed the rest of their army was sweeping aside Oda resistance
ahead of them. They were napping, eating, and having a sip of sake or two (or
three). Meanwhile Arriving at the battlefield by various covered and concealed
routes, Nobunaga’s force massed at the decisive tactical point to overwhelm the
enemy: hitting the Imagawa from several
sides and overwhelming them, taking the commander Yoshimoto’s head in the
process and defeating the invasion of Oda territory at the outset.
So, there you have it: Objective, Offensive, and Mass. Next
time we’ll cover three more Principles of Joint Operations: Maneuver, Economy of Force, and Unity of
Command. Stay tuned!
Lastly, some housekeeping: I am writing this, actually, for an
assignment in my Command and General Staff College—Intermediate Level Education
school. As such, I must throw out the following disclaimer:
The above comments represent the views of the author only, and should not be interpreted to represent the views or official position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.
MAJ Nate Ledbetter
Intermediate Level Education Class 12-002
Staff Group D
Fort Gordon, Georgia
Intermediate Level Education Class 12-002
Staff Group D
Fort Gordon, Georgia
[1]
Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations” Washington,
D.C.: 11 August 2011. Pg. A-1through A-2 is the source for all quoted JP 3-0 definitions of Principles.
